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INTRODUCTION 
In the morning hours of November 9, 2016, as Americans woke up 
to the groggy realization that reality TV celebrity and real estate magnate 
Donald Trump had been elected the forty-fifth President of the United 
States, news networks began calling a lingering but important Senate race 
in New Hampshire. Democratic candidate Maggie Hassan defeated 
Republican rising star, incumbent Senator Kelly Ayotte by a razor-thin 
margin.1 Hassan, a popular two-term governor, had ascended to the state’s 
chief executive office out of the New Hampshire Senate in 2012.2 In 
winning that 2012 gubernatorial race—which established her as a 
national-level politician and the natural challenger to Ayotte in 2016—
Hassan overcame massive flows of direct campaign contributions to her 
opponent sourced through limited liability companies (LLCs), such as 
Dunkin’ Donuts, Planet Fitness, and a large local real estate firm, all using 
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 1. James Pindell, With Hassan Win, N.H. Turns Another Shade Blue, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 9, 
2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2016/11/09/hassan-claims-victory-senate-race/ 
TXJ3qdxlYbwzZi8X8GCCuK/story.html. 
 2. Drew Gingrich, Profile: New Hampshire Gov.-Elect Maggie Hassan, USA TODAY (Nov. 7, 
2012), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2012/11/07/hassan-new-hampshire-governor-
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a subtle gap found in particular state campaign finance laws known as the 
“LLC loophole.”3 The race to succeed her in 2016 would prove even more 
tempting to the big donors.4 
As Hassan moved to the United States Senate, her corner office in 
Concord was won by a close margin by Republican Executive Councilor 
Chris Sununu.5 Ten days out from the election, Sununu received maximum 
contributions from seventeen LLCs sourced to the same address at DEKK 
Group, LLC, the Massachusetts parent company of a number of Dunkin’ 
Donuts franchises.6 Sununu’s opponent, Democrat and fellow Executive 
Councilor Colin Van Ostern, received contributions from LLCs belonging 
to the Brady Sullivan real estate conglomerate, which had previously been 
directing monies to dispatched Republican candidate and Manchester 
Mayor Ted Gatsas before his primary defeat.7 The Gatsas campaign was 
particularly fond of loophole-driven fundraising, having funneled in over 
a quarter of a million dollars from LLCs during the primaries.8 Direct 
contributions from LLCs across all New Hampshire gubernatorial 
candidates in 2016 reached over $450,000, easily outpacing 2012.9 If this 
web of direct contribution money appears confusing, that’s because it is—
and it’s completely legal. 
New Hampshire’s campaign finance laws permit direct contributions 
to gubernatorial candidates from individuals or corporations of up to 
$7,000 per campaign cycle.10 However, no state campaign finance statutes 
discuss, define, or even mention LLCs.11 Each LLC is its own individual 
donor for the purpose of direct campaign contributions, regardless of who 
controls it. Thus, a wealthy individual can max out the $7,000 direct 
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2012), http://nhpr.org/post/gov-candidate-kevin-smith-collects-llc-loophole [https://perma.cc/97NZ-
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 4. Brian Wallstin, Loophole and Connections Help Gatsas Raise Big Dollars for Governor’s 
Race, NHPR (Sept. 1, 2016), http://nhpr.org/post/loophole-and-connections-help-gatsas-raise-big-
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 5. Governor Chris Sununu is the youngest son of former New Hampshire Governor (and Chief 
of Staff to President George H.W. Bush) John Sununu. See Amy Coveno, Sununu Defeats Van Ostern 
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 7. See id. 
 8. See Wallstin, supra note 4. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:4 (2017) (stating that candidates for governor may accept 
contributions up to $5,000 from individuals before the June filing date, and an additional $1,000 after 
the filing date for the primary election and for the general election, totaling $7,000 over the election 
cycle). 
 11. Chapter 664 has no language on LLCs. See generally id. 
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contribution to his or her preferred candidate through every LLC under his 
or her control, limited only by imagination and the ability to set up as many 
LLCs as legally feasible.12 A rich and resourceful person could disperse 
funds directly into the campaign coffers of a preferred candidate without 
limit—some have.13 
The LLC loophole is hardly a feature unique to New Hampshire’s 
campaign finance laws. New York, America’s third-largest state economy 
and home to the world’s most powerful financial nexus, permits maximum 
individual direct contributions of $65,000 to statewide candidates14—and 
it has the same loophole.15 Democrat Andrew Cuomo won the state’s 2010 
and 2014 gubernatorial campaigns, and among his largest contributors was 
a real estate giant that used the LLC loophole to legally funnel millions in 
direct contributions to Cuomo and others through nearly twenty affiliated 
LLCs.16 That’s not quite the $27 donation that politicians like to tout on 
the campaign trail as evidence of virtuous citizen participation in 
representative democracy.17 All told, this loophole exists in the campaign 
finance laws of half a dozen states, encompassing a population of over 50 
million Americans.18 
This ought to be concerning to every American with an interest in 
fair elections and good government. Much of the national conversation 
over the 2016 presidential election revolved around anger regarding the 
influence of big money in politics, the dominance of elites in policy-
making, and the appropriate safeguards of both elections and the right to 
vote. President Trump himself spent a significant portion of his victorious 
                                                     
 12. Jay Surdukowski, How to Spend $1 Million in NH Politics, N.H. BUS. REV. (Jan. 31, 2017), 
http://www.nhbr.com/February-17-2017/How-to-spend-1-million-in-NH-politics/ [https://perma.cc/ 
4MSD-9K6W]. 
 13. See, e.g., Theodoric Meyer, Cuomo Has Raised Millions Through Loophole He Pledged to 
Close, PROPUBLICA (June 13, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/cuomo-has-raised-millions-
through-loophole-he-pledged-to-close [https://perma.cc/5EVG-MRTJ].  
 14. N.Y. BD. OF ELECTIONS, 2016 CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 1, 2 (2016), 
https://www.elections.ny.gov/NYSBOE/Finance/2016ContributionLimits.pdf. 
 15. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-114 (McKinney 2017); see also Editorial, New York’s Big Money 
Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2015, at A26. 
 16. Meyer, supra note 13. 
 17. Throughout the 2016 presidential primary cycle, Senator Bernie Sanders notably and 
repeatedly used a talking point about the average donation to his campaign being $27 to contrast the 
small donors and regular people supporting his campaign with the high-dollar contributors and 
corporations backing other candidates, particularly former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. See 
generally Philip Bump, Bernie Sanders Keeps Saying His Average Donation Is $27, But His Own 
Numbers Contradict That, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-fix/wp/2016/04/18/bernie-sanders-keeps-saying-his-average-donation-is-27-but-it-really-
isnt/?utm_term=.ba1249495732. 
 18. See U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Estimates of Resident Population: April 1, 2010 
to July 1, 2017, https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bk
mk (last visited June 3, 2018). 
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campaign alleging that the elections were rigged against him by moneyed 
elites and powerful political adherents of the Washington status quo.19 
Untangling the contempt many Americans feel for the various 
proclaimed corrupting influences in politics will be an arduous process for 
our system of government and our broader society. What to do about it all 
is a question that yields many answers, even more questions, and little 
consensus. How do we find agreement among contending interests in 
establishing the appropriate maximum contribution a citizen should be 
able to donate to his or her preferred candidate or ballot initiative? There 
is no one right answer. What about voter identification laws? Or the 
Citizens United decision—should the First Amendment protect the money 
spent on political speech or should a constitutional amendment be passed 
to overrule that decision?20 What about the Electoral College? Term 
limits? More daunting still, how do we come up with a way to formally 
tackle these questions and reform our politics with bipartisan, 
comprehensive solutions? 
If resolving these many dilemmas will be a heavy lift for our society 
at large and for the men and women our republic formally tasks with 
broaching these questions, then they are certainly outside the scope of this 
Note. The purpose contained within is rather to point a flashlight at one 
obvious manifestation of unfairness in a poorly lit warehouse of state 
campaign finance laws and to propose a solution. 
The LLC loophole would seem to break Otto von Bismarck’s oft-
quoted axiom that “politics is the art of the possible.” Closing the LLC 
loophole is not just possible—it would be great politics. It would reinforce 
norms of fairness in our elections and, practically speaking, be a relatively 
simple legislative fix of campaign finance statutes. There is a veritable 
menu of options available to legislators in states that have the loophole but 
have not seriously attempted to close it. 
Ultimately, closing the loophole is a question of fairness. Many argue 
that the amount of money candidates can receive is objectionable. Whether 
a candidate or a campaign ought to be able to accept millions, if not 
billions, of dollars in campaign contributions is not the focus of this Note. 
Neither is whether an individual ought to be permitted to give $100 or 
$100,000 as a direct contribution. What is precisely intended is a proposal 
to eradicate the effect of laws, or rather loopholes in laws, that allow 
                                                     
 19. See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, Trump Accuses Clinton of Guiding Global Elite Against U.S. 
Working Class, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/us/politics/trump-
comments-linked-to-antisemitism.html?mtrref=www.google.com; Linda Qiu, Donald Trump’s 
Baseless Claims About the Election Being ‘Rigged’, POLITIFACT (Aug. 15, 2016 3:01 PM), 
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/aug/15/donald-trump/donald-trumps-
baseless-claims-about-election-being/ [https://perma.cc/RMP9-DM5B].  
 20. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 314 (2010). 
2018] The (Dunkin’) Donut Hole: Fixing the LLC Loophole 1231 
enterprising individuals to evade the intent of state legislatures in 
determining fair contribution limits, above which an individual shall not 
go, whether that individual is a natural person or a corporate entity.21 
Part I of this Note reviews the mechanics of the LLC loophole and 
its prevalence around the country and then examines the legal and political 
circumstances of loopholes in New York and Washington, D.C. New 
York’s loophole is the highest profile case, and efforts to close the 
loophole are ongoing. D.C., however, successfully closed its LLC 
loophole. The D.C. City Council employed “affiliated entities” language 
in new statutes to ensure that contributions are sourced to their ultimate 
hand regardless of the business entities used to distribute the campaign 
cash.22 
Part II of this Note focuses in on New Hampshire’s unique 
circumstances for closing its LLC loophole. Why look at New Hampshire 
as a case study? It is a small state with porous campaign finance laws, large 
corporate players that pour money into state races, and a strange and 
gigantic citizen legislature. It also plays an outsized role in national 
politics due to its first-in-the-nation presidential primary and will be the 
site of many speeches railing against money in politics starting early next 
year, as democratic candidates begin their diner-to-diner slog toward the 
January 2020 primary. The state is particularly well suited for a bipartisan 
solution to the LLC loophole that may provide a blueprint for bipartisan 
reform in the remaining states. The loophole has become well known to 
key political insiders in the state (including some who want to close it), 
and its exploitation has been rampant in recent gubernatorial races.23 
Democrats lobbed the first salvo at the loophole in the form of a Senate 
Bill in January of 2017, but the legislation garnered only one Republican 
vote and was killed in a procedural maneuver in February.24 Part II further 
reviews the current relevant statutes and aforementioned legislative effort, 
weighs the methods employed in other states for correcting the LLC 
                                                     
 21. Other types of “LLC loopholes” that afflict campaign finance laws in other states should not 
be confused with the sort at issue here. These will not be explored in this Note, but they are worth 
mentioning to distinguish from the issue here. In Iowa, for example, corporations avoid total state bans 
on corporate contributions by registering subsidiary LLCs. Sarah G. Raaii, A Penny for Your Votes: 
Eliminating Corporate Contribution Bans and Promoting Disclosure After Citizens United, 100 IOWA 
L. REV. 1357, 1369 (2015). In Delaware, laws protecting LLC anonymity keep huge contributions of 
hidden origin flowing into campaigns in New York, which is plagued by the LLC loophole at issue 
here. Chris Bragg, Delaware LLC Laws Allow Anonymous Donors to Pour Cash into New York Races, 
ALBANY TIMES UNION (Apr. 30, 2016), http://www.timesunion.com/ 
tuplus-local/article/Secret-refuge-for-dark-money-7385988.php [https://perma.cc/H62X-W8FX].  
 22. See D.C. CODE §§ 1-1161.01, 1-1163.33 (2018). 
 23. See Wallstin, supra note 3; Wallstin, supra note 4. 
 24. John DiStaso, NH Senate Votes to Require Political Advocacy Groups to Register, Report 
Expenditures, WMUR (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.wmur.com/article/nh-senate-votes-to-require-
political-advocacy-groups-to-register-report-expenditures/8973997 [https://perma.cc/RU4B-Y7C7]. 
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loophole, and culminates in a legislative proposal for closing New 
Hampshire’s loophole. 
Part III broadens the lens to discuss the legal and political 
circumstances implicated in any attempt to close the LLC loophole—in 
New Hampshire and other states around the country. While fixes are not 
necessarily difficult from a statutory perspective, powerful national forces 
push a laissez-faire approach to campaign finance motivated by corporate 
interests but anchored in First Amendment doctrine.25 There is a reason 
that even tepid followers of national politics know the words “Citizens 
United.” This should be of great concern to advocates of campaign finance 
reform. One of the few unifying features of government criticism across 
the left–right divide in recent years is condemnation of the undue influence 
of money in politics. 
I. THE MECHANICS AND PREVALENCE OF LLC LOOPHOLES 
Fixing the LLC loophole for New Hampshire or any other state 
requires an understanding of what statutory gaps were created in campaign 
finance regulatory schemes when creating LLCs came into vogue without 
their effect being accounted for by state legislatures. The various ways that 
the federal and state governments have adapted (or not) have left signposts 
as to how states actively looking to close this loophole could proceed. 
A. Federal Election Law 
Federal election law does not include an LLC loophole. It bans direct 
corporate contributions to candidates for federal office but permits 
contributions from individual persons, LLCs, and partnerships.26 Federal 
election regulations define an LLC as a “business entity that is recognized 
as a limited liability company under the laws of the State in which it is 
established.”27 Each LLC is thus not a corporation under federal or state 
law but its own legal entity for the purposes of making a contribution. This 
is where the statutory contribution rules regarding LLCs end in states with 
the loophole.28 
Federal regulations, however, prevent any loophole within that same 
section.29 Under federal law, a person cannot donate to a candidate in 
amounts aggregating over a contribution index limit for each federal 
                                                     
 25. See Michael Beckel, Supreme Court Gives Corporations, Unions Power to Spend Unlimited 
Sums on Political Messaging, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL. (Jan. 21, 2010), 
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/01/supreme-court-gives-corporatio/ [https://perma.cc/ 
D55M-EYGT]. 
 26. 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(a) (2018).  
 27. Id. § 110.1(g)(1). 
 28. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 664:4 (2017).  
 29. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.1 (2018). 
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office.30 How an LLC chooses to be classified by the Internal Revenue 
Service—as a partnership, as a corporation, or as an individual person—
determines how its contributions are treated.31 Since federal law bans 
corporate contributions, it leaves LLCs with two options. First, for LLCs 
made up of only one person, contributions will be attributed to that 
person.32 When making the contribution, the LLC is bound to “provide 
information to the recipient committee as to how the contribution is to be 
attributed, and affirm to the recipient committee that it is eligible to make 
the contribution.”33 Accordingly, “A contribution by an LLC that elects to 
be treated as a partnership by the Internal Revenue Service . . . or does not 
elect treatment as either a partnership or a corporation pursuant to that 
section, shall be considered a contribution from a partnership.”34 Under 
the second option, if the LLC files with the IRS as a partnership, its 
contributions get attributed to the partnership itself and to its members in 
the proportion of their profit-share from the LLC “according to 
instructions which shall be provided by the partnership to the political 
committee or candidate” or “by agreement of the partners.”35 A scheming 
person could use the partnership classification to, in effect, flout the 
individual limit, but it would require the participation of the LLC’s fellow 
members and would still be capped at double the contribution limit minus 
the profit-share of the other members.36 
Because of these added rules, federal law bears no LLC loophole. 
Contributions get attributed back to the source individual, even if they are 
divided up among the LLC’s members. However, one can envision how 
state legislatures would not wholesale import the federal scheme limiting 
business influence into their own codes, many of which have aggressively 
partisan political climates. Twenty-two states have total bans on corporate 
                                                     
 30. Id. §§ 110.1(b)(1), 110.17. 
 31. Id. § 110.1(g)(2)–(4). 
 32. Id. § 110.1(g)(5). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. § 110.1(g)(2). 
 35. Id. § 110.1(e)(1)–(2). 
 36. An LLC owner intent on maximizing their legal contribution could first contribute the 
maximum amount through his or her LLC. If the maximum contribution is $2,500, and the LLC 
contributed that amount, it would have to be directly attributed to the LLC member who contributed 
it or attributed to the membership in accordance with their profit shares from the LLC. By the latter 
method, if the original donor only had a 20% profit share, only $500 would be attributed to the donor 
despite that he or she had paid the full contribution made on behalf of the LLC. The donor could then 
contribute an additional $2,000, as only $500 had thus far been attributed to the donor. With a 20% 
share in the LLC, a donor could feasibly contribute $4,500 through the LLC and in his or her individual 
capacity.  Such maneuvering is complicated but possible. 
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contributions or partnership contributions.37 Over a dozen states have no 
individual contribution limits whatsoever,38 meaning there is no need for 
a wealthy contributor to filter money through LLCs. 
B. Loopholes Across America 
LLCs are formed and registered under state laws, and they are not 
difficult to organize. Filing fees, often as little as $100, vary from state to 
state, and there is an entire online industry dedicated to quick registration, 
with some merchants advertising assistance and LLC formation in ten 
minutes.39 Few websites require more than a name, address, and some 
form of organizational document. Some states, like New Hampshire, 
require that the LLC’s “certificate of formation shall set forth the nature 
of the primary business or the purpose” of the new entity with the caveat 
that it can freely change to serve any other lawful purpose.40 Other 
jurisdictions consider a statement of the business purpose of the LLC to 
be an optional component of formation.41 Any individual with significant 
business assets could set up multiple LLCs in a very short period of time. 
In states with the loophole, each LLC can contribute the maximum 
contribution to a preferred candidate.42 Thus, owners of expansive 
businesses have this bonus democratic right built in to their businesses, 
and they can exploit it with ease. As the 2014 Cuomo campaign 
demonstrated in New York, this scheme can be manipulated to an 
astronomical effect.43 
As discussed, New York and New Hampshire are not the only states 
with this LLC loophole style. Colorado, Florida, South Carolina, and 
Vermont also have this gap in their campaign finance statutes. Colorado’s 
loophole has been in effect for decades—partisan bickering kept it alive 
despite attempts to close it in 2006 and 2007.44 Florida’s LLC loophole 
remains just one of a myriad of the state’s campaign finance concerns, and 
                                                     
 37. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE LIMITS ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
CANDIDATES (2016), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/elect/Contribution 
LimitstoCandidates2015-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/AF5R-2XW2].  
 38. See id.  
 39. See, e.g., SWYFT FILINGS, File an LLC Online Today in as Little as 10 Minutes, 
https://www.swyftfilings.com/sem/filellc/fileanllc?gclid=EAIaIQobChMI8LWAk6LM2wIVj8JkCh2
nig1BEAAYBCAAEgKF9_D_BwE [https://perma.cc/KMK3-T6U4]. 
 40. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:31(c) (2017). 
 41. See, e.g., D.C. CODE §§ 29-801.07, 29-802.01 (2018); N.Y. LTD. LIAB. CO. LAW § 203(e)(7) 
(McKinney 2017). 
 42. See Surdukowski, supra note 12. 
 43. See Meyer, supra note 13. 
 44. Renee Davis, Amended Campaign Finance Bill Falls Short, COLO. COMMUNITY MEDIA 
(Apr. 4, 2007), http://coloradocommunitymedia.com/stories/Green-Amended-campaign-finance-bill-
falls-short,36704 [https://perma.cc/TUB5-B9QN]. 
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there has been little discussion about closing it.45 In South Carolina, 
lawmakers have made no movement toward closing the loophole either.46 
The loophole appeared in Vermont’s local papers in early 2016 when a 
gubernatorial candidate spoke of the issue, but legislators have yet to take 
any action.47 
1. Potential Hurdles to Closing LLC Loopholes 
The principal obstacles to closing the loophole are awareness and 
political will, not legal authority. Two other jurisdictions—Maryland and 
D.C.—successfully voted to close their loopholes in 2013 by amending 
their campaign finance statutes through legislation in the Maryland State 
Legislature and the D.C. City Council, respectively.48 Neither Maryland 
nor D.C. has had the validity of their legislative action challenged in 
court.49 Any such suit would likely be thrown out very quickly. In the 2010 
Citizens United decision, the United States Supreme Court said that 
regulating direct candidate contributions from corporate and partnership-
like entities served an important government interest in preventing 
corruption and that states were permitted to ban such contributions.50 
Accordingly, LLCs are not likely to be differentiated from their 
fellow business entities for the purposes of campaign finance regulation. 
In 2012, the Supreme Court declined to review a challenge to a city 
ordinance that expanded a corporate contribution ban to LLCs (as well as 
partnerships and limited liability partnerships).51 The Second Circuit 
                                                     
 45. Lucas Daprile, Loopholes Pump Limit-Skirting, Hard-to-Track Money into State Races, 
TCPALM (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.tcpalm.com/news/politics/local/loopholes-pump-limit-skirting-
hard-to-track-money-into-state-races—24743fd5-39f4-662d-e053-0100007f-365914871.html [https: 
//perma.cc/F87A-4AD2]. 
 46. Paul Bowers, Donations from Duplicate Addresses Pour into Mayoral Race, CHARLESTON 
CITY PAPER (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/TheBattery/archives/2015/04/30/ 
donations-from-duplicate-addresses-pour-into-mayoral-race [https://perma.cc/SKZ8-S2K4]. 
 47. Neal P. Goswami, Dunne Shuns Corporate Funds, BARRE MONTPELIER TIMES ARGUS (Mar. 
11, 2016), https://www.timesargus.com/articles/dunne-shuns-corporate-funds/ [https://perma. 
cc/Y76G-PHM7]. 
 48. See Mike DeBonis, Campaign Finance Reform Bill Heads Toward D.C. Council Vote, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/mike-debonis/wp/2013/10/17/ 
campaign-finance-reform-bill-heads-toward-d-c-council-vote [https://perma.cc/LP53-64GQ]; 
Michael Dresser, Campaign Finance Loophole May Be Plugged, BALT. SUN (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-02-07/news/bs-md-campaign-finance-20130207_1_john-
properties-loophole-state-board [https://perma.cc/C76J-NRGJ]. 
 49. See Martin Austermuhle, As Campaign Cash Loophole Closes, DC Businesses Give Big, 
WAMU (Feb. 10, 2015), http://wamu.org/news/15/02/05/as_campaign_cash_loophole_closes_dc_ 
businesses_rush_to_give_big [https://perma.cc/RNA3-CL3W]; Editorial, A Rare Win for Good 
Government in Annapolis, BALT. SUN (Apr. 15, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/ 
news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed-campaign-money-20130415-story.html. 
 50. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343(2010). 
 51. Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 195–97 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied 567 U.S. 935 (2012). 
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concluded that a local restriction on LLCs served an important government 
purpose and did not violate the First Amendment. The Second Circuit held 
that 
legal distinctions between these entities and corporations do not make 
them less of a threat of corruption or circumvention. For the reasons 
that justify the corporate contribution prohibition, therefore, the 
legislature permissibly determined that there is no room in City 
campaigns for entity contributions. While limits may minimize 
circumvention and the appearance of corruption, the City is free to 
decide that these evils must be eliminated to ensure the public’s faith 
in the electorate system.52 
The legal distinction between an LLC and a corporation does not 
equate to a difference in how direct candidate contributions from such 
entities affect transparency or undue influence in elections. Cities and 
states are free to decide if contributions from particular entities are in line 
with their values. 
On solid legal ground, a state legislature attempting to close the LLC 
loophole need only look to the practical statutory schemes already in place. 
The federal scheme described at the beginning of this section is a model 
in theory, but the relevant sections of the federal election law were 
designed with no LLC loophole.53 Maryland and D.C. remain the only 
state governments to have closed an existing LLC loophole, while the 
bipartisan gravy train provided by the loophole in New York has slowed 
the ongoing efforts to follow suit.54 
2. Maryland Reform 
Maryland’s legislature took action in 2013, passing an omnibus 
election and campaign finance reform bill that closed its LLC loophole.55 
Maryland law already prevented corporations from using their subsidiary 
corporations as separate contributors, and the new legislation broadened 
the scope of the rule to capture LLCs by banning separate contributions to 
the same candidate from affiliated “business entities.”56 Under the new 
law, contributions are “considered as being made by one contributor if: (i) 
one business entity is a wholly owned subsidiary of another; or (ii) the 
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business entities are owned or controlled by at least 80% of the same 
individuals or business entities.”57 This amendment prevents a person or 
business from setting up LLCs purely for dispersing campaign funds 
beyond Maryland’s $6,000 limit, as LLCs are now explicitly listed among 
the “business entities” defined by the new law.58 
Maryland’s reform does not apply where the controlling company 
does not share eighty percent of the same ownership.59 It is difficult to 
ascertain how much wiggle room this leaves a determined contributor, but 
legislative behavior in the 2016 session indicates that there is still an intent 
to fully seal the loophole. Maryland House Democrats introduced a bill to 
remove the text of the 2013 reform and replace it with a total ban on 
affiliated “business entities” making contributions, but the bill stalled 
out.60 
B. The Divergent Cases of New York and Washington, D.C. 
Part II of this Note will apply the lessons of this section to the distinct 
situation in New Hampshire. The most useful cases to review for any New 
Hampshire legislator looking to close the LLC loophole are New York and 
D.C., where one can view a complicated and ongoing closure attempt 
(New York) as well as a clean and complete sealing of the loophole (D.C.). 
1. New York 
In New York, a 1996 state Board of Elections ruling created the LLC 
loophole by mandating that LLCs were to be treated like individuals who 
can donate the maximum contribution to a particular candidate in a 
statewide race.61 The mandate completely distinguished them from other 
business entities like corporations and partnerships, and thus, LLCs were 
not subject to the limits or prohibitions that applied to other business 
entities.62 In the last two years, the governor, the legislature, and a lawsuit 
all attacked the state’s LLC loophole. The lawsuit was dismissed in early 
2016.63 The Assembly passed legislation that would, like Maryland, stifle 
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but not seal the loophole; however, it failed to make it out of the Senate 
before the 2016 session ended.64 
The 2016 bill that came out of the Assembly would have classified 
LLCs like partnerships,65 meaning an LLC could contribute up to $2,500 
without having to attribute contributions to its ownership or membership. 
For larger contributions, the aggregated total would “be attributed to each 
partner or limited liability company member whose share of the 
contribution exceeds ninety-nine dollars.”66 
The New York Assembly’s proposed reform would have degraded 
exploitations of the loophole by cutting the amount LLCs can give without 
properly attributing the contribution by a whopping ninety-six percent. 
Given the enormous advertising costs political campaigns face in the New 
York media market,67 such reform would have a significant effect. While 
he has no doubt been the greatest beneficiary, Governor Cuomo has 
repeatedly reintroduced the legislation, but thus far he has yet to carry it 
near the finish line.68 
In spite of his legislative efforts, Governor Cuomo has since 
intimated that a constitutional convention might be necessary to close the 
loophole,69 though a more recent discussion of an omnibus ethics bill again 
included talk of trying to close the loophole.70 New York remains the only 
state with an open LLC loophole that has seen both consistent press 
attention to the problem and some popular support for fixing it. 
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2. Washington, D.C. 
While New York’s legislature has sputtered on the issue, the D.C. 
City Council approved the country’s most comprehensive legislation to 
close an LLC loophole. The city’s 2013 electoral reform bill defined 
“affiliated entities” of businesses and prohibited contributions between 
such entities from exceeding the individual limit.71 
D.C.’s new laws do not explicitly name LLCs among what its code 
broadly calls “business entities.”72 However, LLC’s are considered an 
“affiliated entity” and are subject to the prohibition on contribution 
limits.73 Entities are considered to be affiliated if “(A) [o]ne of the entities 
controls the other; or (B) [t]he entities share a controller, whether that 
controller is another entity or an individual.”74 The bill also defines 
“[b]usiness contributor(s)” as “a business entity making a contribution and 
all of that entity’s affiliated entities.”75 
The specific language in the bill that sealed the loophole mandated 
that “[a] business contributor shall certify for each contribution that it 
makes that no affiliated entities have contributed an amount that when 
aggregated with the business contributor’s contribution would exceed the 
limits imposed by this chapter.”76 Enforcement and oversight authority is 
delegated to D.C.’s Office of Campaign Finance; business contributors 
must provide the office identities and information about affiliated 
entities.77 
The law went into effect in 2015.78 Only three years old, its precise 
impact going forward will have to be studied. However, if business 
reaction to the new rules is a reasonable measure, the Council appears to 
have accomplished its goal. Before the law took effect, business 
contributors piled in cash to preferred candidates through their assorted 
LLCs to exploit the loophole for one last hurrah.79 
One could extrapolate from the varied approaches to closing the LLC 
loophole that there are creative means to do so beyond the methods 
employed by the governments that have done so or have tried. However, 
if reform-minded state legislators could choose any plan to stymie the 
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wealthy donors who currently exploit the loophole, the D.C. model is the 
most complete and feasibly the simplest to graft on to existing campaign 
finance statutes. 
II. CLOSING NEW HAMPSHIRE’S LLC LOOPHOLE 
New Hampshire’s small size, uniquely citizen-driven government, 
and relatively balanced partisan climate make it a better test case for 
bipartisan reform than states with intractable (New York) or ignored 
(Florida) LLC loopholes. In New Hampshire’s recent gubernatorial 
election cycle, now-Governor Sununu was the beneficiary of several LLC 
contributors, including seventeen maximum contributions (totaling 
$119,000) from Dunkin’ Donuts franchises.80 Prior to his general election 
matchup with Van Ostern (who himself benefitted, albeit more modestly, 
from an LLC network), Sununu defeated three primary rivals, including 
Mayor Gatsas, who had vastly out raised him in the Republican 
primaries.81 While Sununu had a significant proportion of his 
contributions directed to him through LLCs, Gatsas had been the preferred 
candidate of area elites—over a quarter of his fundraising haul came from 
LLCs.82 The 2016 involvement of a few mega-donors, like the DEKK 
owner of the Dunkin’ Donuts franchises and the locally ubiquitous Brady 
Sullivan real estate firm, outpaced even the 2012 distributions of direct 
contributions.83 
As discussed in Part I, if New Hampshire residents want to close the 
LLC loophole, they have several blueprints. Washington, D.C.’s reform is 
by far the most comprehensive and straightforward. New Hampshire’s 
current campaign finance laws are minimalist when compared with other 
states, and it would not be particularly complicated to graft in the 
necessary language. Democrats in the State Senate proposed their own fix 
in January 2017, but it was quickly felled by Senate Republicans.84 The 
models demonstrated by the FEC, Maryland, and New York offer feasible 
alternatives and potential compromises. New Hampshire’s political 
institutions, however, are very different from the D.C. City Council,85 
making sweeping reform potentially unpalatable to local business interests 
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and a tactical puzzle for supportive legislators in the partisan minority.86 
Fortunately for reformers, as long as one citizen with a dozen LLCs can 
make thirteen maximum contributions, thus exercising political rights 
unavailable to the vast majority of New Hampshire residents, this issue 
will not go away.87 
A. Structural Changes to the New Hampshire Statutes 
New Hampshire’s current campaign finance prohibitions offer little 
hindrance to eager legislators hoping to fashion a legal closure of the LLC 
loophole. Chapter 664 of the New Hampshire Statutes governs the field, 
and its current rules pertaining to contributions are captured in a relatively 
small number of provisions included therein.88 It bans partnership 
contributions but not corporate contributions.89 State courts have not ruled 
on LLCs and political contributions. New Hampshire’s campaign finance 
statutes include LLCs within the definition of “business organizations,” 
but are otherwise silent on LLCs.90  These “[b]usiness organizations” only 
appear elsewhere in the chapter in the context of either coercion or 
signatures on political advertising.91 No legal impediments to closing the 
LLC loophole appear to obstruct meaningful action. 
However, there are practical challenges of note here. As discussed in 
Part I, Delaware’s permissive corporate secrecy laws (which envelope 
LLCs) are exacerbating the problem in New York. These laws would 
similarly prevent New Hampshire from ascertaining the affiliations of 
Delaware LLCs. Any bill introduced in the New Hampshire legislature 
should include oversight and compliance language to force disclosure of 
LLC affiliations, as was done in D.C. 
The mechanics of reforming New Hampshire’s campaign finance 
statutes are fairly straightforward. Other than the partnership contribution 
ban,92 state law currently imposes no other prohibitions on businesses; 
LLCs and corporate donors are individuals for the purposes of direct 
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candidate contribution limits.93 The chapter contains no language 
discussing subsidiaries or other business affiliations. It does ban union-
affiliated contributions, but this does not apply to business organizations.94 
The reform effort spearheaded by State Senator Dan Feltes last year 
offered a look into the Democratic caucus’s view on closing the 
loophole.95 While the New York and federal models are worth weighing 
as well, it is the D.C. model for reform that offers the most certain and 
mechanically sound closure of New Hampshire’s LLC loophole. 
1. The January 2017 Senate Bill 
In late January, State Senator Dan Feltes introduced Senate Bill 115 
in an attempt to close New Hampshire’s LLC loophole by adding a statute 
to Chapter 664 that would attribute LLC contributions to the owners of 
LLCs.96 The bill itself would have amended Chapter 664:4 to ensure that 
LLC contributions “be attributed to its members as if the contribution were 
made by the members.”97 Under this scheme, an LLC owned by a single 
person would have a contribution attributed to the owner directly; an LLC 
with multiple owners would have the contribution allocated proportionally 
between the members based on their ownership stake.98 After a negative 
recommendation coming out of the elections committee, the bill was 
quickly deemed “inexpedient to legislate” on February 23, which, in New 
Hampshire legislative jargon, means it is dead.99 
Essentially, this proposed reform followed the Maryland model, but 
with less room for maneuvering by the contributor, as there was no eighty 
percent threshold for LLCs with multiple members. In principle, this 
would make it very difficult, but not impossible, for a high-dollar donor to 
outsize his or her contribution limit. A brief discussion of the political 
reasons for this bill’s death will follow in Part II.B. Mechanically, this 
model could be pursued again. 
2. New York and Federal Models 
New Hampshire could opt to follow the proposed New York model. 
A bill could do this by adopting the proposed New York partnership and 
LLC language into the New Hampshire statutes applicable only to 
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LLCs.100 The proposed New York threshold ceiling of $2,500101 for listing 
the contributions to individual members of the LLC would be absurd given 
New Hampshire’s comparative individual contribution limit of $7,000, so 
a state-specific corresponding threshold would have to be agreed upon by 
the legislature. Given the relative size difference between maximum 
contributions in New York and New Hampshire, legislators would have to 
come to a consensus on setting the appropriate threshold for attributing 
contributions. 
Using the federal model is conceivable but practically difficult. LLCs 
would be bound by the classification they choose with the IRS. Importing 
this scheme into Chapter 664 could be complicated, as New Hampshire 
bans partnership contributions and allows corporate contributions102—the 
inverse of the federal rules. One of the essential features of the federal 
regulations applicable to LLCs is the ability to use the partnership scheme 
for attributing contributions on the basis of a partner’s profit-share,103 
which would not translate neatly to LLCs that chose to report as 
corporations. While mechanically possible, the tax-related scheme 
involved would likely spell political doom for any fix modeled off the 
federal scheme. 
3. Following the Washington, D.C. Model 
The D.C. statutory scheme best captures the intent of legislatures to 
set individual contribution limits in the first place. Integrating that scheme 
into New Hampshire’s campaign finance laws would be relatively simple. 
It would require augmenting Chapter 664’s Definitions section to add a 
definition of “affiliated organizations” as “one of the organizations 
controls the other; or the organizations share a controller, whether that 
controller is another organization or an individual.”104 As the state already 
defines business organizations,105 using “organizations” consistent with 
how D.C. used “entities” would likely meet the least resistance. A bill 
would also need to add a “business contributors” definition of “a business 
organization making a contribution and all of that organization’s affiliated 
organizations.”106 
The principal mechanism for closing the loophole could be borrowed 
from the D.C. statutes and deployed in the form of an addition to the RSA 
664:4-c Contributions section: “A business contributor shall certify for 
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each contribution that it makes that no affiliated organizations have 
contributed an amount that when aggregated with the business 
contributor’s contribution would exceed the limits imposed by this 
chapter.”107 The enforcement and compliance responsibilities given to 
D.C.’s Office of Campaign Finance could also be delegated to the New 
Hampshire Secretary of State’s Elections Division.108 
D.C.’s reform stands out as a more complete solution against 
Maryland’s similar affiliated business entities scheme or even the scheme 
employed by Senate Democrats in January. By adopting the Maryland 
model or reviving the language from the New Hampshire Senate bill, New 
Hampshire would only shrink rather than seal its LLC loophole. By 
capping contributions among affiliated entities, D.C. is the only 
government body that has totally sealed an LLC loophole.109 Reformers in 
New Hampshire should take note and follow in stride. 
B. New Hampshire has a Unique Political Environment to Push for 
Reform 
Despite the failure of Senate Bill 115 in January, campaign finance 
reform efforts in New Hampshire have found moderate bipartisan success 
before and recently. For example, in 2016, new filing requirements were 
signed into law in the 2016 General Court session to moderate fanfare,110 
though the final bill was watered down by partisan politicking.111 Still, this 
law compels candidates for office and political committees to file full 
reports of contributions and expenditures with the Secretary of State’s 
office at regular intervals.112 
However, other attempts at campaign finance and electoral reform 
have not been so fortunate.113 New Hampshire publicly grappled with a 
different loophole, known pejoratively as the “Hassan loophole,” after a 
2014 Attorney General Opinion clarified that unlimited cash transfers 
between political committees prior to the filing date were indeed legal.114 
This issue raised much consternation among New Hampshire politicos and 
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the state media, and Hassan used this loophole to help raise funds for her 
2014 reelection bid.115 
Senate Bill 115, drafted by Democrats, was likely doomed from the 
start. Incepted barely a few weeks into the new session after Republicans 
assumed control of both houses of the legislature and the governor’s 
office,116 a more successful approach would have been a bill drafted and 
sponsored in tandem with multiple Republicans on board. However, such 
cooperation may well have been unavailable so early in the term, the first 
in over a decade since the state GOP had last held the governor’s office 
and the legislature.117 It may also have been partisan posturing for the 
electorate. Despite its failure, one important development came out of the 
bill’s failure: a better understanding of the argument in favor of 
maintaining the loophole. Specifically, Republican opposition to the bill 
was based, at least officially, on the bill’s discriminatory targeting of 
LLCs.118 
Broadly, New Hampshire has a unique political environment. It has 
a bizarre, enormous, citizen-run legislature. While its Senate is composed 
of only twenty-four members, the New Hampshire Constitution provides 
its lower house with up to 400 state representatives.119 This makes its 
House of Representatives the fourth largest elected legislative body in the 
English-speaking world behind the House of Commons, the United States 
House of Representatives, and the Parliament of India.120 It is essentially 
a volunteer body, with its members collecting $100 annual salaries.121 The 
level of talent and seriousness varies significantly—within its Republican 
caucus during the last session, representatives ranged from a thoughtful 
millionaire entrepreneur, who finished a close second in the gubernatorial 
primary,122 down to a squalid opportunist and Trump surrogate who 
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repeatedly and unapologetically called for Secretary Clinton to be 
executed in the national press.123 
New Hampshire is also a small state with fewer than 1.5 million 
residents,124 and $7,000 buys a lot more advertising time there than in New 
York.125 When top gubernatorial candidates head into the primaries with 
roughly $1 million raised, several hundred thousand dollars aggregated 
from a handful of donors is a significant advantage if others are playing 
by the spirit of the rules rather than exploiting the loophole.126 New 
Hampshire also holds an outsized influence in national politics. Its first-
in-the-nation primaries bring national politicians to the state to chat with 
voters and bend the ear of local politicians.127 Additionally, the state’s 
voters score exceptionally high in voter power indices—fewer than 3,000 
votes, the closest margin of the fifty states, determined the allocation of 
four electoral votes that have been decisive before.128 In 2000, if 4,000 
New Hampshire voters who pulled the lever for George Bush had instead 
voted for Al Gore, Florida’s famous recount would not have mattered.129 
In a nutshell, New Hampshire could play a significant or leading role 
in closing the LLC loophole for 50 million Americans around the country. 
Chapter 664 offers a fairly open canvas for a statutory fix, and D.C.-style 
reform could easily be written into its campaign finance laws. It also is a 
small state where elections can be impacted by a few hundred thousand 
dollars entering the race from a small group of interested parties. Unlike 
Maryland and D.C., New Hampshire does not have Democratic 
supermajorities in its legislative bodies.130 The State’s political situation is 
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such that some sustained noise could draw its citizen legislature to take up 
the cause in a bipartisan fashion. With no action on the loophole in the 
2018 legislative session, the spring of 2019 offers the next opportunity to 
publicly put questions about campaign finance reform directly to the 
parade of fresh presidential candidates while a campaign finance bill is 
introduced in the legislature. This scenario becomes all the more tempting 
if Andrew Cuomo decides to run. All of this leads into the final question: 
how do politics affect the likelihood of reforming the LLC loophole, in 
New Hampshire or anywhere else?  
III. THE BROADER POLITICS OF CLOSING THE LLC LOOPHOLE 
The political challenges to closing LLC loopholes do not neatly line 
up along partisan lines, though it must be acknowledged that, broadly, 
campaign finance reform is more commonly being stifled from the 
political right, and that is true of this issue as well. 
A. Bipartisan Apathy and Exploitation 
In New Hampshire, both parties have fundraised from LLCs, though 
the disparity in 2016 was tremendous.131 Not all of the LLCs that have 
contributed are vessels for wealthy donors to exploit the loophole and pile 
in cash, but some are.132 Ted Gatsas, for example, had the Brady Sullivan 
real estate firm dispatching funds in full force during the Republican 
primary, but the local rainmakers switched party allegiance after Gatsas 
bowed out and funded Chris Sununu’s Democratic opponent.133 Four years 
ago, as noted, Dunkin’ Donuts and Planet Fitness took a vested interest in 
trying to defeat Maggie Hassan.134 
Beyond the LLC loophole, other campaign finance reforms have 
been urged by both major parties, though often in opposition to political 
opponents. Republicans filed the complaint with the Attorney General that 
spurred the “Hassan loophole” opinion,135 and Democrats pushed the 
aforementioned new disclosure requirements to go on offense against 
Republicans in 2016.136 It is ultimately apparent that there is room to 
maneuver in this space, and bipartisan action is difficult but possible. 
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New York also demonstrates the contending interests involved. 
Governor Cuomo has been the loudest voice for closing New York’s LLC 
loophole, but he has also been its biggest benefactor.137 Reform in the 
legislature over the last two sessions was largely put down by Republican 
opposition in the State Senate.138 New York’s financial sector is one of the 
few major fundraising centers for state Republicans,139 so cutting off the 
loophole further cuts into their fundraising strength in the heavily 
Democratic state. The many Democrats who exploited the loophole also 
stood to gain little by fighting for the bill. Above partisan lines, enacting a 
rule that allows incumbents with connections to exploit those connections 
will favor those already in office, and reform presents a conflict of 
interests. Even though the Democratic Party dominates Maryland and 
Washington, D.C., closing the loophole was a slog that took years to come 
to fruition. 
The other four states with open LLC loopholes run the gamut 
geographically and politically. Colorado is the only one of the four to have 
moved towards closing the LLC loophole. A decade ago, a push was made 
to eliminate it, but it was killed, first by a Governor’s veto140 and then 
again by the legislature in a subsequent effort.141 In Florida, Governor Rick 
Scott and his allies have been handsomely rewarded by the loophole in 
their campaigns, and no serious effort has been undertaken.142 The same 
can be said of South Carolina, where former Governor Nikki Haley and 
others benefitted from the generosity of a handful of big players with 
expansive business networks.143 Strongly left-wing Vermont also has the 
loophole, but virtually nobody is talking about it.144 Pressure to exploit or 
keep these loopholes intact has an apparent rightward bend, but it is 
bipartisan to be sure. 
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B. Ascendency of Money-in-Politics as a Bipartisan Issue 
The real political driver of campaign finance reform writ large will 
be its prominence in popular consciousness about the outsized influence 
of money in politics. The rise of political candidates Senator Bernie 
Sanders and President Donald Trump pulled back the veil on the 
tremendous disdain a significant portion of the U.S. has for moneyed elites 
and the politicians they fund. The high-dollar fundraising superiority of 
traditional Republican primary candidates like Governor Jeb Bush or 
Democratic Nominee Secretary Hillary Clinton was woefully insufficient 
to propel them over the top and actually served as a bludgeon for their 
opponents who painted them as subordinates of the cosmopolitan or 
financial elite.145 With the national tide on this issue potentially lifting all 
boats, campaign finance has the potential to become a national bipartisan 
issue. President Trump’s turbulent first year in office has given rise to 
broad questions about emoluments, conflicts of interest, and nepotism.146 
These developments could weaken headwinds to reform. A push to close 
the LLC loophole in states afflicted with it could benefit from such a trend, 
but states pursuing reform and fulfilling their democracy-lab 
responsibilities could also create regional and ultimately national currents 
that help propel the broader conversation on campaign finance. 
C. Law and Politics in Citizens United 
No discussion of the political climate surrounding a campaign 
finance reform issue would be complete without noting Citizens United. A 
common lamentation of the political left, it has unleashed a torrent of 
money into American election cycles.147 However, a constitutional 
amendment to nullify it is extraordinarily unlikely, and any hope for that 
proposition looks like false hope. The good news for reform is both that 
the political animus it inspires is very real, and—more pertinently—the 
language of the decision itself identifies the regulation of direct 
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contributions as entirely appropriate and able to stand up to the First 
Amendment scrutiny that the case is known for.148 
The plaintiffs had challenged an element of federal election law that 
required that  “televised electioneering communications funded by anyone 
other than a candidate” but explicitly intended to aid that candidate “must 
include a disclaimer” declaring said candidate be “responsible for the 
content of this advertising.”149 Compelled disclosure does not offend the 
First Amendment because the sufficient government interest in getting the 
voters this information is great enough to meet the exacting scrutiny 
standard in play.150 This traces back to the Court’s articulation of the 
principle in Buckley v. Valeo, when it distinguished direct contributions 
from independent expenditures and the sufficient government interest in 
preventing corruption or the appearance of it under strict scrutiny.151 
Justice Kennedy restated that the principle lives on unmolested by the 
decision.152 
Even in the Court’s most vilified take on campaign finance and the 
protection the First Amendment offers to money entering the electoral-
political fray, the Court reasserted the principle that direct contributions 
have a corrupting effect that governments can regulate.153 Closing the LLC 
loophole fits perfectly within this narrative. This is about clean 
government. It is about direct gifts in enormous sums given outside the 
scope of what was intended by right for the individual citizen. It is about 
fighting corruption. A bipartisan win is no good politician’s enemy, and 
an easy fix that adds a little more fairness to elections could be low-
hanging fruit in this climate for an ambitious young legislator in Colorado, 
Florida, or New Hampshire. 
D. A Moral Imperative 
Mechanically, closing LLC loopholes are easy fixes—the statutes are 
not particularly complicated, and there are numerous models to follow, 
ranging from the absolute to the compromise, so state governments have 
the opportunity to flesh these issues out with the political opposition and 
the public to find their best fit. But allowing these loopholes to perpetuate 
and continue to stain state elections is also a moral failing. As long as these 
loopholes remain open, residents of the at issue live under campaign 
finance regimes where the wealthiest citizens can flout the intent of 
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legislatures and contribute exorbitantly beyond what the average citizen 
may legally contribute. It is essential that concerned legislators take action 
to accomplish what they can. 
The unique opportunity to close LLC loopholes amidst a national 
consciousness trending towards political reform makes acting on this issue 
a moral imperative for anyone who thinks it ought to be closed. Among 
the questions about how to reform American politics posed in the 
introduction of this note, none have answers as overwhelmingly obvious 
as what ought to be done with LLC loopholes. Should error and neglect in 
state laws exploited exclusively by moneyed elites be rectified? It does not 
take long to mull that over. 
As this Note has detailed, many states’ campaign finance codes are 
riddled with loopholes affording a variety of ways that enterprising 
campaigns can accept and spend money beyond intended limits and 
mischievous donors can legally purchase a louder, more influential voice 
in a state race.154 Some states have no limits on the amount an individual 
can contribute to a state race.155 The state level is where reform is most 
needed and most likely to be accomplished. Where there are glaring holes 
in law creating unfairness and exploitation in the financing of political 
campaigns, state executives, legislators, and concerned citizens ought to 
take decisive action to fix the problem. 
Closing the LLC loophole is a question of curbing legal but ethically 
dubious political activity. When questioned by a reporter, the Gatsas 
campaign in New Hampshire remarked that the candidate was simply 
following the law by which all the candidates were bound.156 Of course, 
when the question is about the exploitation of a loophole in the law that 
binds them, such a response is hardly satisfying or reflective of good 
judgment or character. The politics of the day are sympathetic to rhetoric 
or efforts dedicated to restoring confidence in the fairness of politics and 
society, and whether that is among our gravest concerns. Those who wish 
to see this loophole closed in their state should not waste this opportunity. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note is about a fairly simple problem with a fairly simple 
solution. To the average American, positing that wealthy individuals and 
enterprises ought to be able to flout the will of the people and assert greater 
rights in making political contributions sounds absurd—but that is 
precisely what schematic errors and neglect in campaign finance laws have 
                                                     
 154. See, e.g., supra notes 44–47. 
 155. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 17-5-1–21 (2017); IND. CODE § 3-9-2-4 (2017); VA. CODE § 24.2-
945 (2017). 
 156. Wallstin, supra note 4. 
1252 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:1227 
done. Candidates for high state office should not be smurfing maximum 
contributions from Dunkin’ Donuts franchises and similarly crafted 
conglomerations of LLCs to flagrantly avoid New Hampshire’s 
contribution limit. Governor Cuomo should not be able to rake in millions 
using the LLC loophole while pushing campaign finance reform with a 
straight face. 
There are solutions—D.C. and Maryland have found the first ones—
and it best serves other states suffering this statutory deficiency to follow 
suit. Several models exist, and there are likely other ways to creatively 
deal with this problem that have not been reviewed or suggested here. New 
Hampshire Senate Democrats took up the issue right away, and while they 
failed, this should not dissuade them from maintaining the pressure on 
their Republican colleagues for reform. If there is one thing they could 
learn from New York, it is how to keep this issue relevant in the halls of 
government and in the press. 
Ultimately, this Note argues that New Hampshire is uniquely suited 
among the states with this loophole to take decisive action on this and 
preserve a little more confidence in government than its citizens will have 
had the day before. A myriad of questions surround how to best manage 
our politics at the national, state, and local levels. Very few have easy 
answers—this one does. Fixing the LLC loophole is no panacea, but 
perhaps a small victory can start a trend. If any unifying result could come 
out of the results of November 8, 2016, it could well be a pushback against 
the sordid business of financing our politics. 
 
